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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the purpose, provi-
sions, or probable consequences of the newly-enacted Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act1 (Cuban Liberty Act) is
beside the point.2 On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed
the Cuban Liberty Act into law, having previously been ap-
proved by the U.S. Congress by wide margins.3 The substantial
support for the Cuban Liberty Act makes it highly unlikely that
U.S. policy towards Cuba will change in the foreseeable future
absent some significant political changes in the Cuban govern-
ment. The Cuban Liberty Act is a reality and those persons
affected by the new law will have to come to grips with its provi-
sions and with how the new legislation will work in practice.
Numerous provisions contained in the Cuban Liberty Act
condemn the government of Cuba for past and present violations
of human rights and international norms of good conduct. One
provision specifically condemns the recent attack by Cuban war-
planes of two small civilian aircraft piloted by "Brothers to the
Rescue," a Miami-based humanitarian organization.4 This inci-
dent appears to have triggered the overwhelming congressional
support for the Cuban Liberty Act, signaled by the dropping of
objections previously raised by the Clinton Administration.
While a discussion of these political matters would surely make
fascinating reading, that is not the purpose of this Article. Rath-
er, this Article will focus on the key provisions of the Cuban
Liberty Act affecting those persons and companies currently
doing business in Cuba or considering doing so.
1. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) [hereinafter Cuban Liberty Act].
2. For a criticism of the U.S. embargo of Cuba, see Eduardo Galeano on the
Internet at: (http://spin.com.mx/%7Ehvelarde/Galeano/pesares.html). For a decidedly
contrary view, see the article written by Adolfo Leyva de Varona which can be found
at: (http'i/www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embgeng.txt).
3. The Helms-Burton bill (HR927), which became the Cuban Liberty and Dem-
ocratic Solidarity Act, was approved by the U.S. Senate on March 5, 1996 by a vote
of 74-22 and was approved by the House of Representatives the next day by a simi-
lar overwhelming vote of 336-86. See 142 CONG. REC. S1511 (daily ed. March 5,
1996); see also 142 CONG. REC. H1749 (daily ed. March 6, 1996).
4. Cuban Liberty Act § 116.
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II. CODIFICATION OF ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
Prior to the adoption of the Cuban Liberty Act, the U.S.
economic embargo against Cuba was largely a creature of execu-
tive orders promulgated by past Presidents ranging from John F.
Kennedy to Bill Clinton.' Section 102(h) of the Act codifies into
law all of the restrictions in effect as of March 1, 1996, subject to
Section 204. This means that all prior restrictions, imposed at
the discretion of past U.S. Presidents, now become settled legis-
lation which can be revoked only with congressional consent or a
judicial declaration of unconstitutionality.
Under Section 204(a), the President can take steps to sus-
pend all or part of the economic embargo against Cuba (after
consultation with the Congress) "to the extent that such steps
contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically elected
government in Cuba," but if Congress subsequently disapproves
of such actions, then the "action of the President under [Section
204(a)] ... shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of a
joint resolution [of Congress] .... "' Thus, although the Presi-
dent appears to maintain his executive power to impose addi-
tional limitations or sanctions on doing business with Cuba, he
may not permanently relax the embargo rules in effect as of
March 1, 1996 unless he consults Congress and they do not
subsequently disapprove.7
Since the Cuban Liberty Act codifies the present restrictions
on doing business with Cuba, all of the restrictions which exist-
ed as of March 1, 1996, including the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations,' continue in effect except to the extent that they
5. The embargo of Cuba began on February 3, 1962, and the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.101-.901 (1996), were promulgated by the Trea-
sury Department the following year pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917, 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 1.
6. Cuban Liberty Act § 204(e)(1).
7. The President can begin to relax the sanctions against Cuba only in the
event there is a "democratically elected government in Cuba," as defined under §
206, or a "transitional government," as defined by § 205. § 201 then specifies what
U.S. policy should be towards a transitional or democratically elected government in
Cuba and § 202 specifies the types of assistance that could be made available to
Cuba in such event.
8. 31 C.F.R. § 515.101-.901 (1996). A good overview of the Cuban Assets Con-
trol Regulations is provided by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Trea-
sury Department and is available for downloading on the Internet at: (go-
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are inconsistent with the provisions of the Cuban Liberty Act.
For instance, if the President desires to reinstitute the right of
former Cuban nationals to make family remittances or to travel
to Cuba, the Cuban Liberty Act provides that the President
"should" insist on certain prior reforms occurring within Cuba
III. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF U.S. NATIONALS
As is evident from many of the comments made prior to and
following the adoption of the Cuban Liberty Act, the clause re-
garding the protection of the property rights of U.S. nationals
has been controversial.1" Recently, statements have been made
by a number of persons ranging from the belief that this provi-
sion will unleash a massive flood of litigation in the United
States and that it encroaches upon the sovereignty of other
countries such as Mexico and Canada, to the belief that the
impact of this provision will affect only a few companies and is
being thoroughly exaggerated by critics of the Cuban Liberty
Act."
The Cuban Liberty Act seeks to protect the property rights
of U.S. nationals by making any person who "traffics" in the
"property" of a "U.S. national" which was "confiscated" by the
Cuban government liable in a U.S. federal court. 2 This provi-
sion of the Cuban Liberty Act takes effect on August 1, 1996,
unless its operation is suspended for a six (6) month period by
pher'Juna.hh.lib.umich.edu:70/00/ebb/fac/cuba.fac). Any interested person can also con-
tact the Office of Foreign Assets Control in Washington D.C. at telephone #(202)
622-2520. As of the date of this writing, the overview of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations needed to be updated to take into account the changes to the law
brought by recent executive orders of President Clinton as well as by the provisions
of the Cuban Liberty Act.
9. Cuban Liberty Act § 112.
10. See David Adams, New Law Fuels Hope of Recovering Losses in Cuba, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at Al; House Sends Cuba Economic Sanctions
Bill to Clinton, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 7, 1996, at 2.
11. See, e.g., Exiles Unlikely to Get Damages Any Time Soon, MIAMI HERALD,
March 6, 1996, at A15. The Secretary of State is required to report to Congress on
or within six months from the date of the Cuban Liberty Act regarding an "estimate
of the number and amount of claims to property confiscated by the Cuban Govern-
ment," whether or not such claims have been previously certified by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission [hereinafter FCSC]. See Cuban Liberty Act § 207.
This report will probably serve as a "blueprint" for any claims which are later filed
under the Cuban Liberty Act.
12. Cuban Liberty Act § 302.
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the President. 13
A "U.S. national" means: (i) any United States citizen; and
(ii) any other legal entity organized under the laws of any part
of the United States which has its principal place of business in
the United States. 4 A U.S. national therefore includes any in-
dividual who is now a U.S. citizen, whether or not such person
"qualified as a national of the United States ... at the time of
the action (e.g., the confiscation of property) by the Government
of Cuba." 5 Consequently, the Cuban Liberty Act brings within
its scope every individual who, although born in Cuba or in oth-
er countries at the time that the Castro Government came into
power, has become a U.S. national. Significant differences exist,
however, in the treatment of U.S. nationals who have obtained
certified claims before the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion (FCSC)5 and other U.S. nationals (e.g., Cuban exiles at
the time of the confiscation who are now U.S. nationals). The
former group of U.S. nationals may bring their actions at any
time after August 1, 1996,"7 while the latter must wait two (2)
years from the date of the enactment of the Cuban Liberty Act
before filing in federal court." Certified claimants also have
priorities in recovering from any "pool" of judicially administered
13. The President may suspend the effective date if he determines the suspen-
sion is "necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba." See id. § 306. It has been reported that the effec-
tiveness of this provision will be extended by the Pregident at least once. U.S. Seeks
to Reassure Allies on Helms-Burton Law, MIAMI HERALD, April 4, 1996, at A16.
14. Cuban Liberty Act § 4(15). Apparently, it does not matter if the U.S. na-
tional is an entity incorporated in the United States but is owned and controlled by
foreign persons who have acquired the claims to property confiscated in Cuba in
accordance with the provisions of the Cuban Liberty Act.
15. Id. § 303(b).
16. Id. Prior to the Cuban Liberty Act, claims could be filed only by persons
who were U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation by the Cuban government.
§ 302(a)(5) does not allow a claim to be filed under the Cuban Liberty Act if the
U.S. national was eligible to file a claim with the FCSC but failed to do so in a
timely fashion. Further, if the FCSC in fact considered and denied the claim, then
the federal court "shall accept the findings of the Commission on the claim as con-
clusive of the action under this section." In essence, if someone was a U.S. national
at the time of the confiscation, but either failed to file a claim or such claim, if
filed, was denied, the Cuban Liberty Act offers no additional recourse. Hence, only
U.S. nationals who have certified claims and U.S. nationals who were previously
ineligible to file claims with the FCSC now have the right to commence actions in
federal court to determine their rights under the Cuban Liberty Act.
17. This date may be extended by the President. Id. § 302(a)(5)(C).
18. Id. It is not clear whether this date for filing actions may also be extended
by the President.
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assets. 9 In addition, it appears that the latter group of claim-
ants must provide thirty-day notice to the possible defendants
pursuant to Section 302(a)(3)(B) if the claimants desire to sue
for treble damages under Section 302(a)(3)(C).
The term "property" means any tangible and intangible
property, including future and contingent rights, and encom-
passes everything ranging from real estate to intellectual prop-
erty rights like patents and trademarks, but does not include,
for purposes of Title III of the Cuban Liberty Act, "any real
property used for residential purposes,"2" with two excep-
tions.2 The exceptions are for: (i) residential real property occu-
pied by an official of the Cuban government or the ruling politi-
cal party in Cuba ("Cuban Officials");22 and (ii) residential real
property the subject of a claim of a U.S. national which has
already been certified by the FCSC.23 Hence, in the case of Cu-
ban exiles who are now considered U.S. nationals but were not
eligible to file claims before the FCSC, they will not be able to
sue for the loss of their former homes in Cuba if the occupants of
these residential properties at the relevant time were persons
other than Cuban Officials on the date of the enactment of the
Cuban Liberty Act, even if Cuban officials occupy the property
19. Id. § 302(f)(2)(B).
20. It is not clear what is meant by the term "real property used for residen-
tial purposes." The exclusion appears to be designed to avoid problems with Cuban
nationals who reside in real properties owned by persons who have departed from
Cuba (even if these persons are now U.S. nationals). The $50,000 limitation is also
intended to discourage small lawsuits involving relatively minor properties (particu-
larly since accrued interest is disregarded for purposes of this calculation). It is not
clear, for example, whether an agricultural property which is used for both residen-
tial and farming purposes would be considered residential real property. It is left for
case law to determine whether the "residential" use must be a primary one, or
whether it can be one of several uses of the real property.
21. Cuban Liberty Act § 4(12).
22. This term is defined to mean any member of the Council of Ministers,
Council of State, central committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, or the Politbu-
ro of Cuba, or their equivalents. See id. § 4(10). Presumably, former members of
these organizations or mere members of the Communist Party (who are not mem-
bers of the central committee) or local neighborhood watch groups are not included
within this definition. It is not clear what level of proof will be required to establish
that a Cuban Official occupied certain residential real property. For instance, how
can a claimant establish that the subject property was occupied on the date of the
Cuban Liberty Act by a Cuban Official - with eyewitness testimony? The key date
for determining the prohibited occupation appears to be the date of the enactment of
the Cuban Liberty Act, not the date of the filing of the suit in federal court or some
point thereafter. See id. § 4(12)(B)(ii).
23. Id. § 4(12).
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at the time suit is brought.24 No limitations exist on the size or
value of the residential real property that is exempted from suit,
except that any claims filed in federal court have to comply with
the jurisdictional requirement that the "amount in controversy"
be in excess of $50,000, exclusive of accrued interest, costs, and
attorney's fees.2"
It is essential that the U.S. national filing the claim in fed-
eral court have ownership of the claim prior to the enactment of
the Cuban Liberty Act, but it is not required that such owner-
ship have existed at the time of the confiscation.25 On the other
hand, if the confiscation occurs after the date of the enactment
of the Cuban Liberty Act, then a U.S. national may not acquire
ownership of the claim by an assignment for value.27
"Confiscated" means the nationalization, expropriation, or
other seizure by the Cuban government of ownership or control
of any property on or after January 1, 1959:28 (i) without the
property being returned29 or adequate or effective compensation
24. For example, residential real property occupied by a foreign diplomat on the
date of the enactment of the Cuban Liberty Act (or by any other person who does
not come within the definition of Cuban Official, even if the property was leased or
licensed from the Cuban government) could apparently not be the subject of any
lawsuit in the United States, except where the claim of the U.S. national was previ-
ously certified by the FCSC.
25. See Cuban Liberty Act § 302(b). Treble damages are also not included in
the calculation of the amount in controversy. It is open to question whether a "class
action" by a group of U.S. nationals holding a number of minor claims, which in the
aggregate exceed $50,000, can commence a lawsuit pursuant to the Cuban Liberty
Act. Further speculation of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but class
action claims will probably fail to evade the threshold limitation contained in §
302(b).
26. Id. § 302(aX4). The Cuban Liberty Act discusses the ownership of the
"claim" regarding the confiscated property; a U.S. national could own a "claim" (e.g.,
by acquisition) even though he was not the original owner of the subject property.
See id. § 302(a)(1).
27. The purpose of this restriction seems to be to limit speculation on claims;
the federal courts are required to deny recognition to any claims which are traded
after the date of the enactment of the Cuban Liberty Act. Presumably this would
still allow the transfer of claims to U.S. nationals as a matter of inheritance, such
as when a former holder of the claim has died and passes the claim to a U.S. na-
tional as part of a will or bequest.
28. Thus, the treatment of claims based on the confiscation of property by the
government of Cuba prior to January 1, 1959, is not addressed by the Cuban Liber-
ty Act.
29. This raises an interesting issue. Suppose the Cuban government were to
opt to "return" the subject property to the U.S. national (admittedly a far-fetched
supposition). Under present law, the U.S. national would be legally powerless to own
or operate such property. In such case, do normal principles of adverse possession
332 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2
being provided to the former owner of the property; (ii) or with-
out having the claim settled pursuant to an international claims
settlement procedure or other mutually accepted procedure for
settling the claim;0 or (iii) the default, failure to pay, or repudi-
ation of any debt owed by the Cuban government relating to any
property nationalized, expropriated or otherwise taken by the
Cuban government or of any settlement obligation of the Cuban
government in connection therewith."1
To "traffic" with respect to confiscated property of a U.S.
national is a broadly defined term for purposes of Title III of the
Cuban Liberty Act.32 It includes a person who "knowingly and
intentionally"" and "without the authorization of any U.S. na-
tional who holds a claim to the property:"3' (i) sells, transfers,
begin to apply? That is, if the subject property is returned and the U.S. national is
held at some point to forfeit his right to possess such property, will a foreign person
who then deals with such property be exempt from suit under the Cuban Liberty
Act?
30. The Cuban Liberty Act provides that a federal court may disregard any
foreign or international finding, order, judgment, or decree that declares the value
of, or invalidates a claim of a U.S. national, except where the declaration of value
or invalidity of the claim occurred in binding arbitration to which the claimant or
the United States submitted the claim. Cuban Liberty Act § 303(a)(3).
31. Id. § 4(4).
32. There is a different definition of "traffic" in § 401(b)(2) for purposes of the
Title IV restrictions (which relate to the exclusion of foreign nationals from the
United States). § 401(d)(2) provides that the definition of trafficking for Title IV
purposes "applies only with respect to acts [which fall into the earlier definition of
trafficking] . . . that occur on or after the date of the enactment of [the Cuban Lib-
erty Act] . . . ." The definition of trafficking under § 401(b)(2) also includes: (i) im-
proving (other than for routine maintenance), investing (by contribution of funds or
anything else of value), managing, leasing, possession, use or holding an interest in
confiscated property; (ii) entering into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise
benefitting from confiscated property; or (iii) causing, directing, participating in or
profiting from any trafficking activities by another person.
33. The term "knowingly" is defined in § 4(9) of the Cuban Liberty Act as
having "knowledge or having reason to know." The Cuban Liberty Act does not spec-
ify whether a foreign person desiring to conduct business in Cuba in the future
must conduct any due diligence investigation itself or whether it can merely rely on
assertions by the Cuban government that the business does not involve any property
confiscated from a U.S. national.
34. It is not clear how the "authorization" of the current holder of the claim
can be obtained, and whether or not implied consent concepts, abandonment, waiv-
ers, and the like can be imputed to the owner of a confiscated property. It may be
possible for a foreign person who is amenable to suit for trafficking in confiscated
property to acquire the claim from the U.S. national who owns such a claim, per-
haps for a small portion of the value of the subject property. Problems are likely to
arise where various persons, some of which may be U.S. nationals, hold claims to
the same confiscated property, which begs the question whether the authorization of
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distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property; (ii) purchases, leases, receives, possesses,
obtains control of, manages, uses or otherwise acquires or holds
an interest in confiscated property; (iii) engages in a commercial
activity using or otherwise benefitting from confiscated property;
or (iv) causes, directs, participates in or profits from trafficking
in confiscated property by or through another person.35
Certain kinds of transactions are exempted even though
they may otherwise fall within the definition of "trafficking."
These include the delivery of international telecommunications
signals to Cuba; 6 the trading or holding of publicly traded se-
curities (with some exceptions) that presumably are related to
Cuba; transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel
to Cuba;37 and transactions and uses of property by a person
who is a citizen and resident of Cuba but is not a Cuban Offi-
cial."
Numerous limitations exist on this new "civil remedy," in-
cluding the eight discussed below. First, there is a three-month
grace period for anyone who is currently engaged in trafficking
in confiscated property within which to discontinue such activi-
ties.39 In other words, past conduct by the persons involved in
trafficking is immaterial.' Second, the amount in controversy
any one such person is enough.
35. Cuban Liberty Act § 4(13).
36. The Cuban Liberty Act now explicitly prohibits investment by U.S. nation-
als in domestic telecommunication services in Cuba. See id. § 102(g), which was con-
sidered unclear under prior law.
37. This raises the question, for example, of whether or not staying at a hotel
in Cuba which is located on confiscated property is permitted if it is "incident to
lawful travel to Cuba" and such use of the property is "necessary to the conduct of
such travel." In other words, must the person using the hotel have some obligation
to stay at other hotels which are not confiscated or built on confiscated property?
Also, there is the issue of whether this exception is so broad as to permit a foreign
company to "manage" a hotel in Cuba situated on confiscated property as a use of
property incident to lawful travel to Cuba. Given that the purpose of the Cuban
Liberty Act is to restrict trafficking in confiscated properties of U.S. nationals, this
latter interpretation is doubtful.
38. Cuban Liberty Act § 4(13). Cuban nationals who are not Cuban Officials
may not be sued under the Cuban Liberty Act even for trafficking in confiscated
property.
39. Id. § 302(1)(A). Thus, the Act targets future trafficking - conducted on or
after June 12, 1996.
40. This does not mean that a claimant cannot sue on a basis other than the
Cuban Liberty Act (e.g., for violation of human rights), but the "election of remedies"
provision provides that the claimant cannot then maintain a separate action under
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has to exceed $50,000" and cannot, except in certain cases, in-
volve Cuban residential real property. Third, only U.S. nationals
with claims that have been certified by the FCSC may com-
mence an action after August 1, 1996 unless this date is extend-
ed by the President; other types of U.S. nationals must wait two
years before going to court.4' Fourth, the claim must have ex-
isted in the hands of the claimant prior to the date of the enact-
ment of the Cuban Liberty Act, or, in those cases where the con-
fiscation occurs after the date of the Cuban Liberty Act, the
claimant must not have given value to acquire such claim.'
Fifth, the claimant must show evidence of ownership of the
property confiscated by the Cuban government. A court is re-
quired to accept as conclusive proof a claim that has been previ-
ously certified by the FCSC." That should not be a problem for
the lawsuits that may be brought under the Cuban Liberty Act
in the first two years, since only U.S. nationals which hold certi-
fied claims will be allowed to sue during that period of time. If a
claim has not been previously certified by the FCSC, the federal
court handling the lawsuit "may appoint a special master, in-
cluding the FCSC, to make determinations regarding the
amount and ownership of the claim."45 It is not mandatory that
a special master be appointed by the federal court, and there is
no guarantee that the FCSC will agree to act as special master
in connection with each case filed under the Cuban Liberty Act
§ 302(f) of the Cuban Liberty Act. If a U.S. national owns a claim already certified
by the FCSC and he sues and recovers under the Act, then: (i) if the recovery is
equal to or exceeds the amount of the certified claim, then the claimant loses all
right to participate in any recovery between the United States and Cuba; (ii) if the
recovery is less than the amount of the certified claim, then the claimant preserves
the right to participate in any government-to-government settlement to the extent of
any deficiency. See id. § 302(f)(2). If the claimant does not recover in the action
commenced under the Cuban Liberty Act, however, the claimant still preserves the
right to participate in any government-to-government settlement.
41. Exclusive of accrued interest, costs, attorney's fees, and treble damages.
42. Such nationals cannot avail themselves of the Cuban Liberty Act until after
March 12, 1998.
43. Presumably, claims for post-Cuban Liberty Act confiscations can be donated
or given to others, such as for charitable purposes, so long as this transfer is not
considered an "assignment for value." This raises the question of whether charitable
contributions which are later deducted from the income tax declaration of the donor
constitute an assignment "for value."
44. Cuban Liberty Act § 303(aX1). There is a presumption that the amount for
which a defendant is liable is the amount that has been certified by the FCSC, but
this presumption can be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 302(aX2).
45. Id. § 303(a)(2).
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(or at what cost its services will be made available to the liti-
gants). Also, there are no criteria to govern the determination of
the special master, and it is not clear that any special master
will rely on any special procedures customarily used by the
FCSC in resolving claims.46
Sixth, the claimant must pay a "uniform filing fee" in con-
nection with the filing of the action, in a "level sufficient to re-
cover the costs to the courts of actions" brought under the Cuban
Liberty Act.4" Seventh, the Cuban Liberty Act contains a stat-
ute of limitations period which provides that an action under
Section 302 may not be brought more than two years after the
trafficking giving rise to the action has ceased to occur. 8 It
may be difficult in certain cases to determine when the "traffick-
ing" has ceased for purposes of this limitation. Finally, any ac-
tion commenced under Title III may be suspended or shall ex-
pire upon the certification by the President that a "democrati-
cally elected government in Cuba is in power.'
Assuming one overcomes all of these hurdles, a U.S. nation-
al may sue any person in federal court who has trafficked in
confiscated property in Cuba which is the subject of his claim.
That would appear to include any agency or instrumentality of
the Cuban government, ° any Cuban Official, and any other
U.S. or foreign person.5 The amount which may be recovered
by the claimant is the greater of: (i) the amount certified by the
FCSC, if applicable, plus interest at the rate set forth in Section
46. Even if the special master is the FCSC and it establishes the ownership of
the subject property by a U.S. national, such determination does not add the claim
to those claims which have been previously certified by FCSC. Id. § 303(a)(2).
47. Id. § 302(i). This fee is in addition to the normal filing fee for commencing
an action in federal court, and is intended to adequately compensate the federal
court for the costs of handling an action under the Cuban Liberty Act. Moreover,
there is no provision for covering the expenses of the special master (including the
FCSC, which makes determinations as to the issues of ownership of the subject
property that is the basis of the claim, as well as of the value of said property).
48. Id. § 305.
49. Id. § 302(H).
50. Any judgment obtained in any such lawsuit will not be enforceable against
any agency or instrumentality of the Cuban government if there is a determination
that a "transitional" or "democratically elected government" is in place in Cuba. Id. §
302(d). Further, under § 302(e), property of a foreign state (including the Cuban
government) is exempt from attachment and execution in an action brought under
Title III of the Cuban Liberty Act "to the extent that the property is a facility or
installation used by an accredited diplomatic mission for official purposes."
51. Id. § 4(11).
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302(a)(1)(B); (ii) the amount of the claim as determined by a
special master or by the FCSC pursuant to Section 303(a)(2),
plus interest at the rate set forth in Section 302(a)(1)(B); or (iii)
the fair market value of the confiscated property.52 Treble dam-
ages may also be recovered in certain cases pursuant to the
Cuban Liberty Act.
5 3
The applicability of concepts such as in personam jurisdic-
tion over foreign defendants5' or service of process are not spe-
cifically provided for in the Cuban Liberty Act.55 One clause
invalidates the "Act of State" defense to justify the actions of the
Cuban government, but the Cuban Liberty Act does not contain
any special waivers of sovereign immunity.5"
IV. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF FOREIGN PERSONS
WHO TRAFFIC IN CONFISCATED PROPERTY OF A U.S. NATIONAL
Another controversial provision is the "exclusion from the
United States" of foreign persons who are involved in the traf-
ficking of confiscated property in Cuba.57 As in the case of the
Title III cause of action, the purpose of Title TV is to isolate
Cuba and to force foreign companies to choose between the Unit-
52. Id. § 302(a)(1XA). "Fair market value" means the higher of (i): the value of
the property on the current date; or (ii) the historical value of the property on the
date of its confiscation plus interest accruing from such date at the rate set forth in
§ 302(a)(1)(B). No rules relate to offsets on the part of the person being sued for
any improvements which may have been made on the property since the date of its
confiscation ("improving" property is part of the definition of trafficking). Finally,
determining the current fair market value of property in a socialist economy with no
historical data or comparable sales of property to examine will be difficult.
53. Id. § 302(a)(3XC)(ii).
54. For instance, assume a Mexican company has acquired and is using con-
fiscated assets in Cuba. A U.S. national which desires to sue the Mexican company
must establish the basis for in personam jurisdiction over the Mexican company.
Nothing would preclude the Mexican defendant from contesting jurisdiction over its
person (or arguing forum non conveniens) when the company does not otherwise
have sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy due process.
55. Cuban Liberty Act § 302(c)(1). § 302(c)(2) provides that service of process
may be made upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in the conduct of
its commercial activities, and upon foreign individuals who "act under color of law"
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1608.
56. Id. § 302(a)(6). Consequently, it may be difficult to sue an instrumentality
of the Cuban government unless one could show, under the Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. §1601, that sovereign immunity has been waived for some reason,
such as that the trafficking activity is "commercial" in nature. See generally JOSEPH
W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (1988).
57. Cuban Liberty Act § 401.
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ed States and Cuba in terms of where they will be allowed to
visit and do business. A related provision urges the President to
enforce existing laws to deny visas to Cuban nationals who are
considered by the Secretary of State to be employees of the Cu-
ban government or of the Communist Party of Cuba.58
Not only can the Secretary of State, presumably acting
through the Immigration and Naturalization Services, deny
foreign persons who violate the Cuban Liberty Act entry into the
United States, but such foreign persons can also presumably be
deported from the United States if they are already here.59 No
provisions detail how such denial or exclusion is to be deter-
mined, applied, enforced, or appealed. Consequently, such proce-
dures must be determined by reference to general immigration
law. Furthermore, it is not clear how aggressive the Immigration
and Naturalization Service will be in enforcing this provision,
nor what additional resources it will need to enforce this law.
The grounds for exclusion are set forth in Section 401(a),
and refer to any "alien"' who, after the date of the enactment
of the Cuban Liberty Act:6 (i) traffics in property of a U.S. na-
tional which is confiscated by the Cuban government; (ii) has
confiscated or has directed or overseen the confiscation of prop-
erty owned by a U.S. national (whether or not the U.S. national
has sued or ever sues on such account); (iii) has converted for
personal gain property of a U.S. national which has been confis-
cated; (iv) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a
controlling interest of an entity that is involved in the confisca-
tion of property of a U.S. national or the trafficking therein;
and/or (v) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of any of the persons
58. Cuban Liberty Act § 102(e). This is a much broader definition than that of
"Cuban Official." In a sense, in a communist country like Cuba, virtually everyone
(except for those very few persons who are self-employed) is an employee of the
Government of Cuba. Even workers for foreign investors in joint venture projects in
Cuba are employed by the Cuban government, which in turn provides such employ-
ees for the use of the foreign investor. It is not clear whether this expansive def-
inition was in the minds of the drafters of the Cuban Liberty Act. Regarding the
communist party language, this does not seem to cover everyone who is a member
of the party, merely those persons who are employed by the communist party.
59. Id. § 401(a).
60. Presumably, a permanent resident of the United States cannot be excluded
from the U.S. by virtue of the Cuban Liberty Act.
61. Unlike the civil remedy provision allowing for a three month grace period,
see supra note 39 and accompanying text, § 401(a) applies upon enactment of the
Cuban Liberty Act.
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listed above."2 It is not clear whether this exclusion from the
United States is intended to be permanent or will last during
the period of time that the foreign person is considered to be
engaged in the prohibited activities (regardless of whether or not
the U.S. national owning the claim to the confiscated property
objects to the entry into the United States of the "excluded"
foreign person).
The Secretary of State can grant an exemption allowing
entry into the United States for an otherwise excluded person if
"necessary for medical reasons or for purposes of [participating
in a] litigation" brought under Title III of the Cuban Liberty
Act." Such an exemption is not automatic, however, and even a
foreign defendant in a lawsuit commenced under the Cuban
Liberty Act would theoretically have to apply to the Secretary of
State for an exemption.
V. PROHIBITION ON INDIRECT FINANCING OF CUBA
Section 103(a) provides that generally no loan, credit, or
other financing may be extended knowingly by a U.S. national,
permanent resident, or U.S. agency to any person for the pur-
pose of financing transactions involving any confiscated property
of any U.S. national (except for financing by the U.S. national
owning such claim for a transaction permitted under U.S. law).
This provision is simple to understand when applied to a trans-
action involving financing for the acquisition or improvement of
a hotel in Cuba that is located on land confiscated from a U.S.
national. A more difficult case is when the financing is provided
for a typical trade transaction where the foreign buyer purchas-
es products (e.g., agricultural crops such as sugar) grown and
harvested in Cuba on land that was previously confiscated from
a U.S. national. Equally difficult will be cases involving financ-
ing of Cuban exports by banks in third countries which exports
62. In addition to the problem of determining which persons are subject to this
restriction and how the Immigration and Naturalization Service will know, is the
issue of the basic fairness of this provision under rights of due process. Theoretical-
ly, the wife of a junior officer of a foreign bank which is "trafficking" with Cuba can
be denied entry into the United States. This language is probably intended more to
have an in terrorem effect on foreign persons who would conduct business with Cu-
ba, since the data required by the United States to enforce the provision will be
difficult to obtain.
63. Cuban Liberty Act § 401(c).
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bear a trademark that in itself constitutes confiscated property.
"Trafficking" is a term which is so broadly defined that it would
appear to cover this indirect type of activity. Any person who
violates this section may be punished by civil penalties as in the
case for violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,'
but does not appear to be amenable to suit by the owner of the
claim except where a case can be established under Title III of
the Cuban Liberty Act."
VI. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO
CUBA
The Cuban Liberty Act also restricts U.S. foreign aid to
countries and international organizations which provide assis-
tance in various forms to Cuba. Section 102(a) encourages the
President to apply certain sanctions against countries which
provide assistance to Cuba. Under Section 111(b)(1), the Presi-
dent can also withhold assistance to any country which provides
assistance to Cuba's nuclear facility at Jaragua (near
Cienfuegos) in an amount equal to the amount of any assistance
and credits provided by the third nation to Cuba "in support of
the completion of the Cuban nuclear facility at Jaragua."" Sec-
tion 111(b)(2) provides a number of examples of permitted assis-
tance which will not cause the U.S. to withhold foreign assis-
tance.
Under Section 106 of the Cuban Liberty Act, the President
is required to monitor any assistance that countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union provide to the Cuban government.67 Any fa-
vorable trade arrangements (i.e., trade which is considered "non-
market-based trade") and other types of assistance to Cuba
would make these countries ineligible for assistance from the
United States."
64. A person who violates these rules is subject to a civil penalty of $50,000.
Id. § 102(d). The normal procedures for notice, hearing and judicial review apply in
this case.
65. Id. § 103(c).
66. Id. § 111(bXl).
67. No specific mention is made of the former Eastern Bloc countries such as
Poland and Romania.
68. Cuban Liberty Act § 106.
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Further, if any international financial institution approves a
loan or other assistance to Cuba over the opposition of the Unit-
ed States, the Secretary of the Treasury must withhold from any
payments due to such institution an amount equal to the
amount of the loan or other assistance given to Cuba.6" The
President is required to present a report to Congress on or with-
in ninety (90) days from the date of the enactment of the Cuban
Liberty Act in which he details the assistance which Cuba is
receiving from other nations and also describes the current busi-
ness activities being conducted by foreigners in Cuba.7 °
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
The many other provisions of the Cuban Liberty Act (e.g.,
opposing the lifting of the suspension of Cuba as a member of
the Organization of American States),71 are beyond the scope of
this Article.
The Cuban Liberty Act does contain a savings clause which
provides that if any portion thereof is held invalid, the remain-
der of the Cuban Liberty Act shall continue to apply.72 In view
of the various constitutional and other challenges that may be
made by opponents of the Cuban Liberty Act, this savings clause
is designed to keep as much of the Cuban Liberty Act in place
while certain of its provisions are tested in court.
VIII. SUMMARY
The Cuban Liberty Act does not expressly purport to prohib-
it a foreign person from conducting business with Cuba or trav-
eling to that country. Similarly, the Act does not prohibit U.S.
nationals from conducting business with Cuba and traveling to
Cuba to the extent allowed by U.S. law. The Cuban Liberty Act
permits the exclusion of foreign persons from the United States
and makes U.S. nationals and foreign persons liable in U.S.
federal courts if they are knowingly and intentionally: (i) traf-
ficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government; and
(ii) the property belongs to a U.S. national who does not consent
69. Id. § 104(b).
70. Id. § 108.
71. Id. § 105.
72. Id. § 5.
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to the use of his or its property.73 Foreign nationals who are
engaging in prohibited activities might well decide to run the
risk of being sued in the United States, and if sued, to defend
against any such liability on a number of grounds. Similarly,
foreign nationals may take the risk that the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service will never seek to bar them from
entering the United States.
Given the broad definition of "trafficking," it is clearly the
case that many types of business dealings between Cuba and
foreign nationals may be covered by the Cuban Liberty Act. The
Cuban Liberty Act is directly aimed at foreign persons who cur-
rently own, manage, or otherwise make use of properties that
were owned by U.S. nationals and confiscated by the Cuban
government. Within that category are those properties which are
the subject of certified claims before the FCSC and have been
public knowledge for some time.
It will be much harder to determine the validity and extent
of claims of persons who were not previously U.S. nationals and
hence could not file their claims with the FCSC. While there has
been some publicity regarding certain major properties (such as
sugar mills) confiscated by the Cuban government, the number
and value of possible claims is unclear. Such claims, however,
must wait at least two (2) years before they can be asserted in
U.S. federal court.
The Cuban Liberty Act is designed to increase the pressure
on the Cuban government by restricting assistance to countries
that would provide aid to Cuba, as well as by forcing certain
foreign persons to make a choice between doing certain kinds of
business with Cuba or doing business with the United States. It
is quite likely that there may be several court challenges to the
Cuban Liberty Act, either based on U.S. constitutional principles
or treaty obligations previously undertaken by the United
States.74 What may come from this jurisprudence cannot be
73. The Cuban Liberty Act provides that "trafficking" is a problem with regard
to property confiscated by the Cuban government which was formerly owned by a
U.S. national only if the U.S. national does not consent to the use of his or its
property. Id. § 4(13).
74. Regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Cuban
Liberty Act states that NAFTA does not purport to modify or alter U.S. sanctions
against Cuba. Cuban Liberty Act § 110(b). The issue, of course, is whether the Cu-
ban Liberty Act itself modifies or alters sanctions against Cuba. In recent press re-
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gauged with accuracy at this point. Moreover, in the ever-chang-
ing ebb-and-flow of relations between Cuba and the United
States, other incidents could arise which provoke further modifi-
cations of the embargo with Cuba.
It does appear that the Cuban government is very appre-
hensive about the impact of the Cuban Liberty Act on its econo-
my. What may eventually occur is a subject of speculation, but
the U.S. appears to have drawn a "line in the sand" against
Cuba and has now explicitly required foreign persons to essen-
tially choose between the U.S. and Cuba. The obvious conclusion
of the U.S. Congress and the President is that these foreign
persons will prefer to maintain their ties to the United States
and consequently foreign investment in Cuba will cease or sub-
stantially decline. It is impossible to know whether a lack of
foreign investment in Cuba will deprive the Cuban government
of badly needed hard currency revenues, perhaps worsening
living conditions on the island and fostering internal rebellion,
or whether the Cuban Liberty Act will itself provoke liberaliza-
tion towards foreign investment by the Cuban government in
order to attract greater hard currency revenues. In either case,
the United States is assuming that the Cuban Liberty Act may
perhaps lead to the eventual democratization of Cuba.
ports, both Canada and Mexico have claimed that the Cuban Liberty Act violates
NAFTA. Cuba Trade Sanctions Anger Some U.S. Allies: Canada, Mexico May Strike
Back, SEATTLE TIMES, March 7, 1996, at Al.
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